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WAS CAMILLUS RIGHT?  
ROMAN HISTORY AND NARRATOLOGICAL STRATEGY IN LIVY 5.49.2* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This article deals with one particular aspect of Livy’s narrative of the Gallic Sack of Rome, told 
in Book 5, and traditionally placed in 390 B.C.1 – namely the issue over the validity of the ransom 
agreement struck by the Romans with the Gauls. The broader context is well known – and needs 
only brief reiteration here.2 When the Gauls march on Rome, the Romans give battle at the river 
Allia, leading to a resounding Gallic victory. Most of the Romans flee the battlefield and then the 
city, except for a small group of both old and young, male and female, who hold out on the 
Capitoline Hill. That hill is subsequently put under siege by the Gauls. Following several months 
of beleaguerment, both sides are depicted as severely worn out by hunger and fighting. It is 
important for present purposes to stress that when the Gauls stood at the gates and besieged the 
city, one of Rome’s greatest heroes, Marcus Furius Camillus, was noticeably absent.3 Camillus 
was in neighbouring Ardea, some fifty miles south of Rome, training an army of Roman soldiers 
to challenge the Gallic invaders after his recent recall from exile and appointment to the 
dictatorship. But before Camillus’ return to Rome, the besieged Romans surrendered and agreed 
a ransom with the Gauls in order to liberate their city. The continuation of the story as given in 
Livy is equally well known. Camillus arrives in the middle of the ransom exchange, asking for the 
exchange to be stopped. Unsurprisingly, the Gauls are not keen on following Camillus’ orders, 
and insist on the ransom. Consequently, Camillus challenges the agreement between Romans 
and Gauls on a constitutional basis; the agreement was reached with a lesser magistrate after 
Camillus’ appointment to the dictatorship (5.49.2): 
                                                          
* For exchange on various Livian adventures, including the present one, I owe thanks to Dennis Pausch, 
and to Michael Crawford. I should also like to thank the editor, Bruce Gibson, for his very helpful input. 
For Livy’s text, the following OCT editions have been used: R.M. Ogilvie (ed.), Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita. 
Tomus I. Libri I-V (Oxford, 1974); C.F. Walters and R.F. Convey (edd.), Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita. Tomus II. 
Libri VI-X (Oxford, 1919); J. Briscoe (ed.), Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita. Tomus III. Libri XXI-XXV (Oxford, 
2016). The translations are mine. 
1 390 B.C. is the year given in the so-called Varronian chronology; Polybius gives by contrast the year of 
the Peace of Antalcidas and the siege of Rhegium by Dionysius of Syracuse, in the (Olympiad) year 387/6 
B.C.: 1.6.1-2, with F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1957) on 1.6.1 (pp. 
46-7). A brief summary of the matter (with further bibliography) is in M. Humm, ‘From 390 B.C. to 
Sentinum: political and ideological aspects’, in B. Mineo (ed.), A Companion to Livy (Chichester, 2015), 342-
66, at 362 n. 1. 
2 The full story is in Livy 5.33-49.7. 
3 This article is concerned with the version of events – and the role given to Camillus – in Livy’s narrative 
only. The literature on the episode in general, and on the figure of Camillus in particular, is vast. Recent 
contributions that discuss Camillus’ role during the Gallic attack on Rome include C. Bruun, ‘“What every 
man in the street used to know”: M. Furius Camillus, Italic legends and Roman historiography’, in id. 
(ed.), The Roman Middle Republic. Politics, Religion, and Historiography, c. 400-133 B.C. (Rome, 2000), 41-68; J.D. 
Chaplin, ‘Livy’s use of exempla’, in B. Mineo (ed.), A Companion to Livy (Chichester, 2015), 102-13; M. 
Coudry, ‘Camille: construction et fluctuations de la figure d’un grand homme’, in M. Coudry and T. Späth 
(edd.), L’invention des grands hommes de la Rome antique (Paris, 2001), 47-81; J.F. Gaertner, ‘Livy’s Camillus 
and the political discourse of the Late Republic’, JRS 98 (2008), 27-52; B. Mineo, Tite-Live et l’histoire de 
Rome (Paris, 2006), 222-37; id., ‘Camille, Dux fatalis’, in G. Lachenaud and D. Longrées (edd.), Grecs et 
Romains aux prises avec l’histoire (Rennes, 2003), 159-75; T. Piel and B. Mineo, Camille ou le destin de Rome 
(Clermont-Ferrand, 2010); T. Späth, ‘Erzählt, erfunden: Camillus. Literarische Konstruktion und soziale 
Normen’, in Coudry and Späth (edd.), (this n.), 341-412; J. von Ungern-Sternberg, ‘Camillus, ein zweiter 
Romulus’, in Coudry and Späth (edd.), (this n.), 289-97. 
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Cum illi renitentes pactos dicerent sese, negat eam pactionem ratam esse quae postquam ipse 
dictator creatus esset iniussu suo ab inferioris iuris magistratu facta esset, denuntiatque Gallis ut 
se ad proelium expediant. 
 
When they, resisting, said that they had come to an agreement, he [Camillus] denied that an 
agreement was valid which, after he himself had been made dictator, had been concluded by a 
magistrate of lower status without his instructions, and he announced to the Gauls that they 
should prepare themselves for battle. 
 
The constitutional argument has often been repeated by modern scholars. Ogilvie comments 
that ‘(t)he dictatorship was held to put all other magistracies into suspension’.4 Feldherr notes 
similarly that ‘(o)nce Camillus has been appointed dictator, his imperium supersedes that of the 
lesser magistrates who negotiated the surrender’.5 And to explain why the Gauls nevertheless 
entered into negotiations in Camillus’ absence, Ross observes that ‘the Gauls, of course, could 
hardly have known either of Camillus’ appointment as dictator or of the fact that the dictatorship 
superseded all other magistracies’.6  
In purely technical terms, Camillus’ argument can be upheld. Going by the evidence for 
later centuries, for which we have reasonably good evidence for the role and powers of the 
dictator (otherwise than for the fourth century B.C.), the dictator enjoyed political supremacy, 
even if in practice the magistrates in office at the point of the dictator’s appointment continued 
with their term of office.7 In Livy’s own days, moreover, the dictatorship was revived in what 
Lintott has termed ‘a stronger and more authoritarian form’, no doubt influencing Livy’s take on 
Camillus’ powers:8 elsewhere – in Book 6 – Livy preserves a tradition that emphasizes the 
(supreme) powers of the dictator vis-à-vis other magistrates (6.16.3 and 6.38.13). Regarding 
Camillus’ remit as dictator, we are at the same time in a similar situation to that assumed by Ross 
for the Gauls: we do not have knowledge of the formal dictatorial realm for what is envisaged to 
have been Camillus’ second appointment to the dictatorship (of five in total): Livy merely 
comments that for the Romans who assembled in ever larger numbers in Veii, ‘the time was now 
ripe to return to their native city and snatch it from the hands of the enemy’, but that ‘a strong 
body lacked a head’; for these reasons, they ‘resolved to send for Camillus from Ardea, but not 
till the Senate at Rome had been consulted’ (5.46.5-7). Whatever the narratological 
inconsistencies and the procedural irregularities, the overall context of Camillus’ appointment to 
the dictatorship is that of a state emergency, which fits the military remit that drove many 
appointments to this office – rei gerundae causa.9 Viewed with all this in mind, it is entirely possible 
to conceive of Camillus’ powers as including the powers of decision over Rome’s surrender and 
ransom, once he was appointed to the dictatorship. It is also important to emphasize that the 
thrust of the story is to foreground Camillus’ imperium, through his powers as dictator, and by 
extension Livy’s historiographic authority to re-write Rome’s history. Feldherr has consequently 
argued that ‘(t)he authority of Livy’s representation of the past, his emphatic denial that the 
                                                          
4 R.M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5 (Oxford, 1965), on 49.2 (p. 738). 
5 A. Feldherr, Spectacle and Society in Livy’s History (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1998), 81. 
6 R.I. Ross, Livy Book V (Bristol, 1996), on 49.2 (p. 143). 
7 The idea that a dictatorship entailed the suspension of the existing magistracies (but for the tribunate) is 
stated in Polyb. 3.87.8 (promising also a fuller discussion later on, which has however not survived); yet, it 
is not borne out by the evidence for the Romans’ political practice. 
8 A.W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999), 113, and generally 110-13. 
9 The standard military remit of appointments to the dictatorship in the early Roman Republic is 
discussed in G.K. Golden, Crisis Management During the Roman Republic. The Role of Political Institutions in 
Emergencies (Cambridge, 2013), 11-41. Brief discussion of the procedural irregularities in Livy’s depiction 
of Camillus’ appointment to the dictatorship is found in Ogilvie (n. 4), on 5.43.6-46 (pp. 727-8). 
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Romans were ever ransomed, rests on the imperium of Camillus itself’.10 But there is also another 
way of looking at the episode, which opens up a fresh perspective not only on the actual 
constitutional claim made by Camillus, but also on Livy’s historiographical method. For this, the 
focus needs to be shifted from Camillus to those under siege at Rome. Before doing so, 
however, two disclaimers are in order. 
First, while the present study has repeated recourse to (later) historical events and 
knowledge, it is not as such concerned with Rome’s history. In other words, this article does not 
deal with what happened in 390 B.C.: in my view, the Livian text is poorly equipped to function as 
a reliable guide to that period. Instead, my exploration of other relevant historical contexts serves 
to tease out what a late Republican reader might have made of Livy’s narrative: I therefore 
discuss evidence and knowledge that that late Republican reader might have had. ‘At best’, this 
article deals with historical issues in as far as it deals with Roman historiography of the late 
Republic, but not beyond. Second, this article concentrates, as stated, on the particular issue of 
the validity of the ransom agreement struck by the Romans with the Gauls that Livy features in 
his account of the event. For reasons of analytical clarity, I do not deal here with other related 
issues that press forward when reading Livy’s narrative – such as for instance the ambiguous 
manner in which Livy phrases the Roman surrender that leads to the ransom agreement, 
implying technically (i.e. legally) wrongly that the Romans chose between surrender and ransom.11 
Nor do I deal with the broader issue of the underlying question as to whether the Romans 
bought their freedom with gold rather than iron, including the numerous modern opinions as to 
whether the Romans did indeed lose their city, surrendered and/or ransomed themselves.12 The 
present argument focuses, plainly, on the few words in which Livy narrates Camillus’ challenge 
to the ransom agreement, and the specific constitutional case made by Camillus in doing so. Put 
differently, the title says it all. In sum, the point of this article is to ask a simple and direct 
question: was Camillus right? It is time to join the Romans in their wait for the dictator. 
 
 
WAITING FOR CAMILLUS … 
 
In his description of the situation at Rome, Livy notes that the army on the Capitol was waiting 
for Camillus; worn out by hunger, they looked out day after day to see if any relief from the 
dictator was forthcoming – but it was not. Eventually, therefore, they decided that they could not 
hold out any longer, but had, as Livy puts it, to surrender or ransom themselves. Livy tells us that 
the senate consequently met and instructed the tribunes of the soldiers to arrange terms with the 
Gauls. Thereafter, Quintus Sulpicius met with the Gallic leader, Brennus, to settle the matter. 
Then follows the narrative of the actual ransom exchange. Livy sketches the despair and ensuing 
decisions in the following manner (5.48.6-8):13 
                                                          
10 Feldherr (n. 5), 81. 
11 In addition to the ambiguity created by Livy’s choice of words, the fact that the ransom had not been 
completely exchanged by the time of Camillus’ arrival has also been regarded as evidence that the 
surrender (!) was not complete. Thus, J.P. Davies, Rome’s Religious History: Livy, Tacitus and Ammianus on 
their Gods (Cambridge, 2004), 115 writes that ‘the dictator “happened to arrive”, and duly intervened’ at 
the point at which ‘the remaining Romans are about to capitulate to the Gauls and ransom the city’ (my 
emphasis); similarly also Golden (n. 9), 21. 
12 I analyse the legal dimensions of the Roman surrender and ransom, as well as Livy’s (deliberately) 
ambiguous narrative in a forthcoming monograph: U. Roth, Saving libertas: Livy, the Gallic Sack of Rome, and 
the Shape of Roman History. See also the contribution in n. 31 below. 
13 Although Livy uses the verb paciscor to refer to the act of agreeing the terms between Romans and 
Gauls, which in other contexts has contractual overtones (see H. Cornwell, Pax and the Politics of Peace. 
Republic to Principate [Oxford, 2017], 15-23), he conspicuously avoids the use of words that would clearly 
identify the agreement as a contract, such as most notably foedus. This avoidance makes good sense in the 
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… interim Capitolinus exercitus, stationibus uigiliisque fessus, superatis tamen humanis omnibus 
malis cum famem unam natura uinci non sineret, diem de die prospectans ecquod auxilium ab 
dictatore appareret, postremo spe quoque iam non solum cibo deficiente et cum stationes 
procederent prope obruentibus infirmum corpus armis, uel dedi uel redimi se quacumque 
pactione possent iussit, iactantibus non obscure Gallis haud magna mercede se adduci posse ut 
obsidionem relinquant. Tum senatus habitus tribunisque militum negotium datum ut 
paciscerentur. Inde inter Q. Sulpicium tribunum militum et Brennum regulum Gallorum 
conloquio transacta res est, et mille pondo auri pretium populi gentibus mox imperaturi factum. 
 
Meanwhile the army on the Capitol was worn out with sentry duty and mounting guard; and 
though they had overcome all human ills, yet there was one, hunger, which nature would not 
suffer to be overcome. Day after day they looked out to see if any relief from the dictator was at 
hand; but at last when even hope, as well as food, began to fail them, and their weapons almost 
overwhelmed their weak bodies as they set out on sentry duty, they declared that they must 
either surrender or ransom themselves, on whatever terms they could make; for the Gauls were 
indicating very plainly that they could be persuaded to abandon the siege in return for a quite 
small sum. Then the senate met, and gave the tribunes of the soldiers the job of agreeing the 
terms. Then, at a meeting between Quintus Sulpicius a tribune of the soldiers and the Gallic 
chief Brennus, the matter was settled, and a thousand pounds of gold was agreed as the price of 
a people that was destined presently to rule the nations. 
 
Notwithstanding the many complexities of the short passage, the emphasis on the desperate and 
prolonged wait of those holding out in Rome highlights the absence of the magistrate in charge – 
i.e. Camillus the dictator – day after day, diem de die. But the hoped for intervention was not 
forthcoming. It is notable in this context that amid total desperation and panic the Romans on 
the Capitoline Hill were mindful of due procedure. Thus, despite finding themselves in a 
situation of despair, the Romans are depicted by Livy as acting in an entirely methodical fashion 
in their ensuing deliberations with the Gauls. First, following the army’s declaration, the chief 
authority – i.e. the Senate at Rome – is mobilised to authorise negotiations with the Gauls. Then, 
the military tribunes are given the task of coming to terms with the Gauls, i.e. of negotiating. 
Finally, Quintus Sulpicius meets with Brennus to agree the deal and the subsequent ransom. This 
highly disciplined demeanour of those on the Capitoline Hill comes, as stated, on the back of the 
Romans’ active waiting for Camillus: it is only when the situation gets so bad that further waiting 
for Camillus can no longer be endured and justified that the request is made to initiate 
negotiations with the Gauls.14 However odd the Romans’ behaviour from a practical perspective, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
context of a surrender and ransom, which are not of a contractual nature (in Roman legal thought): see 
Roth (n. 12), ch. 2.  
14 But this actual adherence to good order in a situation of total despair is then reminiscent of Livy’s 
earlier stress, at 5.46.7, on the observance of due procedure by the Romans in Veii who asked for 
Camillus’ recall from exile: adeo regebat omnia pudor discriminaque rerum prope perditis rebus seruabant (‘due 
respect thus controlled everything and they observed proper procedure, although all was almost lost’). 
And like the earlier act, at Veii, the later adherence to what in the context was due process needs 
including in the list of pious and virtuous behaviour that the Romans are seen as engaging in following 
their disastrous defeat at the hands of the Gauls at the Allia – which is widely seen as ‘the chief theme’ 
after the battle: T.J. Luce, ‘Design and structure in Livy: 5.32-55’, TAPA 102 (1971), 265-302, esp. 268-71 
(and 271 for the quotation); see also S. Oakley, ‘Reading Livy’s Book 5’, in B. Mineo (ed.), A Companion to 
Livy (Chichester, 2015), 230-42, at 236-7; and D.S. Levene, Religion in Livy (Leiden, New York and 
Cologne, 1993), 194-5 and 202. The key actions that signal the return of Roman piety include the decision 
to hold out on the Capitoline Hill, combined with the rescue of the sacred objects, and their removal 
from Rome (5.39.10-11); the selfless action of Lucius Albinius, who transports the sacred objects together 
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it is Camillus’ absence that allows the Romans on the Capitoline Hill to engage in deliberations 
with the Gauls that entail in addition to their own surrender also the surrender of their 
commonwealth – i.e. Rome.  
 A historically minded reader – then as now – might well be tempted to regard the Roman 
military tribunes charged with the negotiations as tribuni militum consulari potestate, i.e. as vested 
with consular powers.15 One theory about the rationale behind the consular tribunate suggests 
that this office was created as a result of an ever more complex military situation towards the end 
of the fifth century B.C. – at least this is what Livy reports in Book 4 (4.7.2).16 In short, these 
consular tribunes could be understood as dealing with military emergencies. Seen this way, the 
Senate’s choice of such office-holders to undertake the negotiations with the Gauls makes good 
sense. But even leaving aside that Livy distances himself from this theory by merely reporting in 
Book 4 what others hold to be the truth – sunt qui …, Livy’s narrative has in any case Marcus 
Furius Camillus appointed to the dictatorship prior to this point, as already stated in the 
Introduction above. Whatever type of military tribunes we assume the chosen men to have been, 
i.e. with or without consular powers, by the time Quintus Sulpicius and colleagues enter the 
Livian stage, Camillus was vested with dictatorial powers: he, not the tribuni militum, was in 
charge. But why, then, does this great Roman hero need to challenge explicitly the constitutional 
basis for what has been agreed between Romans and Gauls? Why is there a seeming need to 
argue? The idea that the Gauls were ignorant of Camillus’ appointment and powers, entertained 
for instance by Ross and cited earlier, does not solve the riddle: Livy’s readers are Romans, not 
Gauls. The problem is on the Roman side. It is time to contextualise the army’s waiting through 
other episodes in which a decision was made in the absence of the magistrate with the 
appropriate authority.  
A suitable starting point for such a discussion is the issue over the appointment of a 
dictator in 217 B.C., during the Hannibalic War, and in an emergency situation that is in broad 
terms comparable to that described by Livy for the events in 390 B.C. In 217 B.C., the Romans 
were under massive duress, with defeat and disaster following one after another. When, finally, 
4000 cavalry under the pro-praetor Gaius Centenius had diverted their path after hearing news of 
the Battle at Lake Trasimene, they fell into the hands of Hannibal in Umbria. The response to 
this in Rome was to have recourse to the institution of the dictatorship. In his account of the 
matter, Livy explicitly reports that the due process for the appointment of the dictator was 
ignored (22.8.5-6): 
 
Itaque ad remedium iam diu neque desideratum nec adhibitum, dictatorem dicendum, ciuitas 
confugit; et quia et consul aberat, a quo uno dici posse uidebatur, nec per occupatam armis 
Punicis Italiam facile erat aut nuntium aut litteras mitti, quod nunquam ante eam diem factum 
erat, dictatorem populus creauit Q. Fabium Maximum et magistrum equitum M. Minucium 
Rufum. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with the Vestal Virgins in his cart to Caere (5.40.7-10); the sacrifice of the older consular and triumphal 
senators, who had chosen to remain (5.39.13-40.1), prepared for the arrival of the Gauls, clad in the 
insignia of office, and seated in the atria of their homes, awaiting, for all practical purposes, slaughter by 
the Gauls (5.41.1-9); the performance of a family sacrifice on the Quirinal Hill by Gaius Fabius Dorsuo, 
endangering his life by crossing the enemy lines (5.46.1-3); the insistence of Marcus Furius Camillus on 
the proper procedures for his recall as dictator to Rome, however impractical and dangerous (5.46.11); 
and the continued reverence for the sacred geese, despite the sustained period of hunger (5.47.4). Note 
that Luce adds to this list also ‘(t)he reward to Manlius on the Capitol of extra food, despite near-
starvation (47.8)’: (this n.), 271 (and 274-5 and 277). See also the ‘long list’ in Oakley (this n.), 236-7 (but 
note also Oakley’s questioning comments on Luce’s clear-cut peripeteia-argument: 241). 
15 As was the CQ reader who suggested discussion of this office. 
16 For detailed discussion of this office, and the source problem, see S.P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, 
Books VI-X. Volume 1: Introduction and Book VI (Oxford, 1997), 367-76. 
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And so the community took refuge in a remedy that had now long been neither needed nor used 
– the nomination of a dictator. And both because the consul, by whom alone it seemed one 
could be nominated was absent, and because it was not easy when Italy was controlled by Punic 
arms to send a courier or a letter to him, the people made Q. Fabius Maximus dictator, and M. 
Minucius Rufus master of the horse, which had never been done before that day. 
 
The situation in 217 B.C. is at once similar to and different from the particular matter under 
discussion here for 390 B.C. The constitutional aberration in 217 B.C. affected the actual 
appointment of the dictator, while the issue over the Roman surrender and ransom agreement in 
390 B.C. that are the focus of the present inquiry concerns the powers of the dictator once in 
office.17 But structurally, there are important parallels between Quintus Fabius Maximus’ 
appointment to the dictatorship in 217 B.C. and the agreement reached between the Romans and 
Gauls in 390 B.C. that deserve teasing out.  
Thus, Livy reports for 217 B.C. that the standard process was ignored because the consul, 
who had the required authority to nominate the dictator, was absent from Rome. Consequently, 
the dictator was elected by the People (dictatorem populus creauit). The legal aberration of the 
decision-making in 217 B.C., as well as the constitutional room for manoeuvre in practice, have 
been highlighted by Pina Polo:18 
 
What happened in 217 demonstrates the general constitutional flexibility of Republican Rome 
and also represents an absolutely exceptional case. The appointment of a dictator had to be made 
by a consul – this is unquestionable – but circumstances forced a change in this process, and the 
dictator was simply elected directly by the people. 
 
Livy reports that only seven years later, in 210 B.C., the People once again elected a dictator (for 
the purpose of holding the elections), this time because of the refusal of the consul Marcus 
Valerius Laevinus to comply with the orders of the Senate (27.5.14-19). Laevinus proposed 
Marcus Valerius Messalla for the role, but the Senate refused his proposal because Messalla was 
outside the ager Romanus, in Sicily, where he was in charge of the fleet. The Senate therefore 
requested that Laevinus should put the matter to a vote for the People to decide. Irrespective of 
the many complexities of the matter, it is clear that the Senate’s request for the decision to be 
made by the People was motivated by the impossibility of adhering to the standard procedure. 
Pina Polo consequently concludes that ‘(b)oth episodes make it plain that the appointment of a 
dictator was an exclusive prerogative of one of the consuls unless a situation of absolute emergency 
arose’ (my emphasis).19  
 The two episodes are of course distinctly removed in time from both the Gallic Sack and 
Livy’s lifetime; but our source material is not brimming with other suitable examples of issues 
that arose when a magistrate in charge was absent. That said, we can be reasonably certain that 
these developments in the 210s were generally known in late Republican Rome. Moreover, Livy’s 
narrative of the Hannibalic War in Book 22 makes an explicit connection between the men 
appointed in 217 B.C. and the Gallic Sack of Rome. Thus, in a speech put into the mouth of 
Marcus Minucius Rufus that heavily criticizes the military strategy of Quintus Fabius Maximus, 
the latter is counter-positioned with Camillus: adopting a focus that directs the readers’ attention 
away from the great shame that the Gallic Sack brought upon Rome, Fabius’ passivity is directly 
                                                          
17 See the reference to Ogilvie in n. 9 above regarding the irregularities in Camillus’ appointment to the 
dictatorship. 
18 F. Pina Polo, The Consul at Rome. The Civil Functions of the Consuls in the Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2011), 
189. 
19 Pina Polo (n. 18), 189-90. 
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contrasted with Camillus’ forceful resolve and action (22.14.11). In addition to this direct 
mention of Camillus in Minucius’ speech, Chaplin has pointed out broader similarities between 
the two narratives arising from the speech: the Fabius-Minucius pairing effectively recalls that of 
Camillus with the other great Roman hero involved in saving the Romans from the Gauls in 390 
B.C. – Marcus Manlius Capitolinus; Chaplin concluded that in his critique of Fabius, Minucius 
‘resembles his villainous predecessors, Romans such as Manlius Capitolinus who arrogantly mis-
apply the past’.20 In sum, there exists a clear link between the two events in Livy’s text that his 
contemporary audience would not have missed. 
If, then, the actions of army and Senate on the Capitoline Hill in 390 B.C. are seen against 
the backdrop of events in the 210s, they appear in a different light: the emergency that caused 
procedural irregularities in 390 B.C. has a (later) historical pedigree. More specifically, seen 
through the lens of the situation in 217 B.C., the emphasis on the army’s desperate looking out 
for Camillus to appear in Rome provides a new context in which to read the subsequent 
surrender and ransom agreement: the Romans on the Capitoline Hill are not just waiting for 
military help; the Romans on the Capitoline Hill are also mindful of due procedure. In 217 B.C., 
the magistrate who alone possessed the necessary powers for the nomination of the dictator was 
absent, and it was not possible to communicate easily by letter either. It was precisely his absence 
that necessitated and justified at the same time the diversion from the standard process. Similarly, 
in 390 B.C., having sent news to Camillus via a courier of his appointment to the dictatorship,21 
the Romans on the Capitoline Hill looked out for the dictator on a daily basis before they 
eventually decided to surrender and agree a ransom. If one understands Camillus’ remit as 
dictator to include the powers of decision over Rome’s surrender and ransom price – as has been 
elaborated in the Introduction above – the narrative’s emphasis on the long wait contextualises 
the subsequent actions taken by the army and the Senate as a constitutional emergency measure 
in the absence of the appropriate authority. But when viewed from this angle, Senate and populus 
Romanus can be perceived as having struck a valid ransom agreement with the Gauls after all. 
Hence arises the need for Camillus’ (counter-)argument. 
 
 
… AND READING LIVY 
 
The idea that the Romans on the Capitoline Hill struck a valid ransom agreement with the Gauls 
is, obviously, not the view adopted by Camillus. But the episode in 210 B.C. also helps to 
contextualise Camillus’ subsequent insistence on his greater powers: in 210 B.C., Laevinus 
attempted to reassert his powers vis-à-vis the Senate thrice. First, he refused to put the matter 
before the People; then he prevented the urban praetor from taking his place in the process; and 
finally, after the election of Quintus Fulvius Flaccus to the dictatorship, Laevinus refused to 
appoint Flaccus to the office. It was therefore necessary for the Senate to instruct the other 
consul to undertake the task of appointing the dictator.22 Laevinus’ effort at reasserting his 
consular powers – without success – provides a parallel for Camillus’ insistence on his dictatorial 
powers. But there is more here than just a (later) historical context that helps to flesh out the 
kind of action ascribed to Camillus in 390 B.C. 
It is important at this point to call attention to the fact that Livy does not actually answer 
the question as to which version is correct – that of Camillus or that of the Gauls. Instead, Livy 
                                                          
20 J.D. Chaplin, Livy’s Exemplary History (Oxford, 2000), 115 (with 43-4). 
21 The news is delivered (in the most cumbersome way from Rome via Veii to Ardea) through the daring 
act of Pontius Cominus, who passes the enemy lines to return to Veii, whence he came to inform the 
Senate about the decision of the Romans based in Veii that Camillus should be recalled from exile: 5.46.8-
11. 
22 Brief discussion, with further bibliography, is found in Pina Polo (n. 18), 189. 
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merely narrates Camillus’ constitutional challenge to the agreement with the Gauls (and the 
subsequent ‘solution’ to the problem, on the battlefield – which has, however, nothing to do 
with the constitutional argument as such); in essence, Livy puts both interpretations of the 
matter on show, beside one another, a technique known in ancient historiography from 
Herodotus onwards.23 In his detailed study of the episode, Feldherr wrote that the Gallic 
contention that the agreement is binding ‘is rendered doubly invalid by Camillus’ imperium’, and 
that Camillus ‘is also “rewriting history” by invalidating in his own voice rival versions of the 
liberation of Rome’.24 But we do not actually hear Camillus’ voice because Camillus does not 
speak here; the view ascribed to him (quoted fully in the Introduction above) is narrated in the 
third person, not in direct speech, much like the view ascribed to the Gauls. In short, the two 
perspectives are narrated by the extradiegetic narrator, and not by any of the actors in the 
narrative themselves. Moreover, the two contradictory positions on the constitutional validity of 
the agreement, and by implication on Camillus’ powers, are expounded without comment or 
verdict.  
Livy’s handling of the episode stands in contrast to how he deals with similar situations 
elsewhere in the Ab urbe condita – which help to throw into relief what is different here. Thus, on 
other occasions, when reporting differing viewpoints, Livy may give the ‘answer’, i.e. he may add 
a comment, often (but not always) in his own (first person) voice – what Pausch has called ‘die 
zweite “Stimme”’ (following his identification of the narrator’s voice as the ‘first voice’).25 For 
instance, in his discussion of the so-called pax Caudina – the peace possibly agreed between 
Romans and Samnites in 321 B.C., following the spectacular entrapment of the Roman army at 
the Caudine Forks – Livy states unambiguously that the view expressed by Claudius 
Quadrigarius regarding the procedure through which the agreement was reached was wrong:26 
Itaque non, ut uolgo credunt Claudiusque etiam scribit, foedere pax Caudina sed per sponsionem facta est (‘so 
the Caudine Peace was not made by means of a treaty, as people in general believe and as 
Claudius even states, but by a sponsio’, 9.5.2)27 Similarly, in his account of the appointment of 
Camillus to the dictatorship, Livy first narrates that once the messenger who brought news of 
Camillus’ nomination to the office to Veii had arrived, Camillus was fetched from Ardea; but he 
then immediately adds a different version of the developments, stating clearly that the latter 
version is preferable: ... seu, quod magis credere libet ... (‘... or rather, as is better to believe ...’, 
5.46.11). And we have also already seen Livy’s distancing from what he reports on the occasion 
of his discussion of the reasons for the creation of the consular tribunate. In clear 
contradistinction, no such judgemental or ‘preferential’ comments are offered regarding the 
validity of the agreement between Gauls and Romans in 390 B.C.  
                                                          
23 e.g. Hdt. 5.44-45 (actively also inviting his readers to judge for themselves); and for programmatic 
statements of reporting what he has been told, and what different people have told him, see 2.123.1 and 
7.152.3. For discussion of Herodotus’ use of variants, see F.J. Groten, ‘Herodotus’ use of variant 
versions’, Phoenix 17 (1963), 79-87. 
24 Feldherr (n. 5), 81. 
25 D. Pausch, Livius und der Leser. Narrative Strukturen in ab urbe condita (Munich, 2011), 11: ‘läßt sich die 
zweite “Stimme” vereinfacht als diejenige des Autors verstehen, der sich außer in den praefationes immer 
dann – zumeist in der esten Person Singular – zu Wort meldet, wenn unterschiedliche 
Überlieferungsvarianten diskutiert werden’; see also pp. 9-12 for discussion of the different voices of 
narrator and author. The English translation is mine. 
26 The broader context of the Roman debacle at the Caudine Forks is that of the so-called second Samnite 
War, caused by the Roman foundation of the Latin colony of Fregellae in north-western Campania, on 
the Liris, half-way between Sora and Interamna (as the river flows), in 328 B.C.: see E.T. Salmon, Samnium 
and the Samnites (Cambridge, 1967), 214-54, and 187-94 for discussion of possible treaties involving Rome 
in the early to mid-fourth century B.C. 
27 The polemic against one’s historiographic peers and predecessors is a typical feature of ancient 
historiography: J. Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (Cambridge, 1997), 218-26. 
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Livy’s narrator enjoys of course regularly the benefit of hindsight. But why, then, does 
the narrator – or Livy – not say which version is correct? One way of answering this question is 
to deny the narrator – or Livy – the kind of total knowledge that is characteristic for instance of 
the Homeric narrator, and that has also been attributed to historians, such as Herodotus.28 In 
support of this view, Livy’s admission, earlier in Book 5, of his own limited knowledge of 
matters of great antiquity could be adduced (5.21.9): viewed in this manner, Livy simply did not 
know which constitutional claim was valid. The fictional nature of much that is ascribed to the 
figure of Camillus – i.e. Livy’s evident lack of sound knowledge regarding the events in which 
Camillus plays a significant role in the Ab urbe condita – functions then more broadly to support 
this view.29 But there is perhaps yet again a more meaningful way of addressing the issue, if 
further account is taken of recent advances in the historiographic and narratological study of the 
Ab urbe condita. 
As Miles has emphasized in his work on Livy’s early Rome, the Ab urbe condita offers a 
history that ‘perpetuates and interprets the collective memory on which the identity and 
character of the Roman people depend’.30 And as Feldherr has highlighted in the passage quoted 
in the Introduction above, there is much at stake for Rome’s collective memory in the way the 
Gallic Sack is ended. Moreover, while Camillus’ success on the battlefield against the Gauls 
clearly functions to liberate Rome from the Gallic invaders, the military achievement does not 
invalidate or undo the preceding Roman surrender.31 If we return with all this in mind to the 
passage under scrutiny here, it becomes clear that by leaving the issue over the constitutional 
validity of the Romans’ surrender and ransom agreement with the Gauls unresolved, Livy 
demands that his readers decide for themselves. This narratological tactic is clever; through it, 
Livy includes his readers in the ‘decision-making process’ of validating one or other version of 
events: if they adopt the viewpoint implicitly ascribed to the Gauls, they are forced to admit that 
Rome was surrendered and ransomed; if they opt for Camillus’ claim, they help liberate Rome 
from the Gallic invaders without damage to Rome’s juridical being. In other words, it is not 
Camillus who ‘acts to ensure that the Romans will not “live by having been ransomed” 
(5.49.1)’,32 but Livy’s readers – if they choose the ‘correct’ answer regarding Camillus’ 
constitutional claim.33  
                                                          
28 See I.J.F. de Jong, ‘Herodotus’, in ead., R. Nünlist, A. Bowie (edd.), Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in 
Ancient Greek Literature (Leiden, 2004), 101-14; for a critical position, see J. Marincola, ‘Herodotus and the 
poetry of the past’, in C. Dewald and J. Marincola (edd.), The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus (Cambridge, 
2006), 13-28, at 15. 
29 The Camillus-legend was first exposed as fictitious by L. de Beaufort, Dissertation sur l’incertitude des cinq 
premiers siècles de l’histoire romaine (Paris, 1866 [1738]), 248-9; Niebuhr subsequently commented on the 
groundlessness of the Camillus-legend (‘ihrer völligen Fabelhaftigkeit’): Vorträge über römische Geschichte, an 
der Universität zu Bonn gehalten, ed. by M. Isler (Berlin, 1846), 386; Mommsen called it ‘die verlogenste aller 
römischen Legenden’: Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, 1899), 1018 n. 2. Camillus is today seen as perhaps the 
most embellished Roman hero of the age, as for instance by T.J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome. Italy and 
Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) (London and New York, 1995), 317, who 
described Camillus as ‘the most artificially contrived of all Rome’s heroes’. 
30 G.B. Miles, Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca, 1995), 74. 
31 On the relationship between surrender and ransom, and their constitutional consequences, see generally 
W. Dahlheim, Deditio und societas: Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der römischen Außenpolitik in der Blütezeit der 
Republik (Munich, 1965), 7-14 and 53-64. See also n. 12 above. 
32 Feldherr (n. 5), 81, referring to Livy 5.49.1: Sed dique et homines prohibuere redemptos uiuere Romanos. 
33 In her discussion of the narratees of Herodotus’ histories, de Jong suggests for types of passages similar 
to the one under discussion here that the narratees are ‘invited to note the contrast’: de Jong (n. 28), 111. 
Livy’s elaboration of the narratees in 5.48.4-8, i.e. the Gallic invaders and the Roman soldiers and 
survivors, is not detailed enough to allow comment on their expected reaction. My view on the desired 
reaction of Livy’s readers goes on the other hand beyond the noting of contrasts, and towards active 
decision-making (for contemporary purposes ultimately) outside of the text, elaborated below (with n. 
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The role of the reader has attracted much intense discussion in recent scholarship on 
Livy. In his 2011 study of the narrative structures and techniques in the Ab urbe condita, Pausch 
has elaborated with great clarity what he calls ‘the involved reader’ (‘der involvierte Leser’) in a 
number of episodes.34 In similar vein, Kraus, in her discussion of repetition and empire in the Ab 
urbe condita, roughly one decade earlier, has noted more broadly that ‘(b)eyond perhaps all other 
genres, history needs its readers’; and, she continued:35 
 
Whether we regard Livy’s monumentum as a treasury or a jumbled heap, it demands our attention, 
insists that we compare, contrast, interpret, and, above all, judge. Only the consensus of readers, 
following the historian’s clues, can identify a given character or event as good or bad exemplum, a 
subject of imitation or avoidance; the sum total of such identifications establishes the narrative as 
an authoritative version of the past. 
 
In the passage under discussion, precisely such ‘identification’ is encouraged and in fact 
demanded of the reader. But what makes our text particularly interesting for analysis of the role 
of the reader in our understanding of the Ab urbe condita is that Livy does not nudge the reader 
firmly one way or another, i.e. Livy holds back on offering what Kraus calls ‘the historian’s 
clues’, unlike on other occasions, as noted.36 All the reader gets in the particular context of the 
constitutional argument is a subtle encouragement to take against the Gauls (also) on this 
occasion, and, by implication, to side with the view embodied by Camillus. Thus, to reiterate, at 
the very start of the passage under discussion, the Gauls are said to object vehemently to the 
request made by Camillus following his interference: Cum illi renitentes … (quoted in full above).37 
The Gauls are thereby presented as the internal narratees of Camillus’ request to stop the 
ransom. At the same time, the external narratee, i.e. Livy’s Roman reader, is thus enticed to 
question their objection. The narratological emphasis is on the play with the negative 
identification, i.e. Roman (external) reader versus Gallic (internal) narratee. The episode thus 
constitutes a good example of the fact that narratees provide, as de Jong has put it, ‘the readers 
with figures to identify with or distance themselves from’.38 But that is all. Importantly, Livy does 
not have recourse to the same or another narratological device (such as comment provided by the 
narrator, as already shown) with regard to the actual constitutional argument that follows 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37). 
34 Pausch (n. 25), 191-250, and passim; the English translation is mine. 
35 C. Kraus, ‘Repetition and empire in the Ab urbe condita’, in P. Knox and C. Foss (edd.), Style and 
Tradition. Studies in Honor of Wendell Clausen (Stuttgart, 1998), 264-83, at 264. 
36 On a broader plane, Thucydides’ repeated lack of comments have similarly been interpreted as evidence 
for the need of involvement on the part of the reader: W.R. Connor, ‘Narrative discourse in Thucydides’, 
in M.H. Jameson (ed.), The Greek Historians: Literature and History. Papers presented to A. E. Raubitschek 
(Stanford, 1985), 1-17, esp. 11. 
37 The preceding passage, in which Camillus actually appears on the set, benefits from stronger 
narratological devices to arouse the attention of Livy’s reader. Thus, the passage begins with a ‘but’ (sed), 
followed by the contextual information that the expected outcome – i.e. the completion of the ransom 
payment – will not come to fruition; further, Camillus’ arrival is additionally explicitly labelled as an 
unexpected happening: forte quadam (Livy 5.49.1). For discussion of the narratological use of what de Jong 
has called ‘presentation through negation’ to ‘contradict the narratee’s expectations or create new ones’, 
including the use of interactional particles (on the example of Herodotus), see de Jong (n. 28), 111. 
Outside the study of narratology, Livy’s labelling of Camillus’ appearance forte quadam has been discussed 
in the context of the study of religion in the Ab urbe condita, because of the providential character that can 
be attached to fors: Ogilvie (n. 4), 737 talks plainly of ‘divine intervention’ (see also his comments on 1.4.4, 
at p. 48: ‘god-inspired’); further exploration is in Davies (n. 11), 115-6. See also J. Champeaux, ‘Forte chez 
Tite-Live’, REL 45 (1967), 363-89, for an exposition of the unexpected (as opposed to accidental) 
association carried by fors. 
38 de Jong (n. 28), 6. 
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Camillus’ appearance and request to halt the ransom exchange.39 Furthermore, it is in fact 
difficult to identify Camillus’ interference as a good exemplum,40 as Livy’s reader is reminded on a 
later occasion. Thus, in Book 9, Livy recalls the event, in his narrative of the above mentioned 
Roman debacle at the Caudine Forks in 321 B.C., and in the voice of one of the deceived enemies 
of Rome, who puts Camillus’ action in line with other occasions on which Rome is depicted (by 
them) as having played foul (9.11.6-7):41      
 
Nunquamne causa defiet cur uicti pacto non stetis? Obsides Porsinnae dedistis; furto eos 
subduxistis. Auro ciuitatem a Gallis redemistis; inter accipiendum aurum caesi sunt. 
Pacem nobiscum pepigistis ut legiones uobis captas restitueremus; eam pacem inritam facitis. Et 
semper aliquam fraudi speciem iuris imponitis. 
 
Will there never be a reason, when you have been beaten, for you to stand by what you have 
agreed? You gave hostages to Porsinna – and withdrew them by a trick; You ransomed your 
community from the Gauls with gold – and they were cut down as they were receiving 
the gold. You pledged us peace, on condition that we gave you back your captured legions – and 
you nullify the peace. And always you give fraud some colour of legality. 
 
As I have shown in the previous part, the decision to surrender and to agree a ransom with the 
Gauls on the part of those in Rome can be viewed as producing a valid outcome in an 
emergency situation. Here, in Book 9, the same view resurfaces more sharply by implicitly 
referring to Camillus’ constitutional argument even as fraud, thus raising the bar for the readers’ 
identification with Camillus: Et semper aliquam fraudi speciem iuris imponitis. This is not the moment 
to elaborate on the relationship between the mentioned events.42 But the comment in Book 9 
serves to corroborate forcefully the constitutional reading of the actions by army and Senate on 
the Capitoline Hill in 390 B.C. put forward above. Yet, if we accept that the Roman surrender and 
subsequent ransom agreement with the Gauls can be understood as juridically valid actions, this 
means that the desire to privilege an interpretation of the text that denies the Roman surrender 
and ransom through Camillus’ intervention is imbued with some considerable tension.  
It is of course widely agreed (as already mentioned with particular regard to Livy himself) 
that later historical knowledge of developments in the early Republic was fragmentary at best, at 
Rome and beyond.43 It is therefore unsurprising that the Gallic attack on Rome attracted 
                                                          
39 On the use of changing narratological perspectives in the Ab urbe condita, see D. Pausch, ‘“Autor, 
übernehmen Sie” – der Wechsel zwischen den Erzählebenen in der antiken Historiographie’, in U.E. 
Eisen and P. von Möllendorf (edd.), Über die Grenze. Metalepse in Text- und Bildmedien des Altertums (Berlin 
and Boston, 2013), 197-219. 
40 Camillus’ exemplarity has often been emphasized by modern scholars: see, e.g., Coudry (n. 3), 49, who 
speaks of ‘un passé reculé d’actions exemplaires’; Späth (n. 3), 386, who stresses that the ongoing 
reinvention of the figure of Camillus focuses on mores in order to exemplify social norms; or Chaplin (n. 
20), 115, who foregrounds Camillus’ earlier insistence on due senatorial sanction. 
41 On the function of enemy speeches in Livy that challenge Roman approaches and viewpoints, see 
Pausch (n. 25), 170-87. 
42 The episode involving Porsinna belongs to the narrative thicket concerned with Rome’s transition from 
regal to republican rule: Livy 2.10-14.4; brief discussion is in Ogilvie (n. 4), 255. I discuss the relationship 
between the Gallic Sack and the Caudine Fork disaster, as well as the later (related) Roman debacle at 
Numantia in 137 B.C., in a forthcoming article: U. Roth, ‘Travelling back in time: Numantia, the Caudine 
Forks, and the (late) making of Marcus Furius Camillus’ legal armoury’. 
43 The Romans themselves conceptualised the Gallic Sack as a watershed regarding the availability of 
archival sources for later historians, allegedly because of the destruction of Roman records in the fire that 
devastated many parts of the city during the Gallic attack. A key exponent of this view is Livy himself, 
who states plainly at the outset of Book 6 that he will offer a ‘clearer and more certain account’ of Rome’s 
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numerous different treatments in antiquity; as Williams has put it: ‘(i)t is apparent from the 
extant versions that the tradition of the sack was constantly remade, and at any one time 
circulated in a number of different versions’.44 Moreover, the third-century examples discussed 
above document plainly the fundamental difficulty over reaching clear answers to constitutional 
questions concerned with the powers associated with particular offices: there was regularly no 
easy solution to such problems. The struggle over the relationship between the executive and the 
judicative in reaching crucial decisions for the state that has characterised the political scene of 
the UK in the period in which this article has been written is a good, if painful illustration of the 
kinds of challenges involved. But the tension that I have just argued for between the two 
viewpoints contained in the episode points towards a more particular aspect of the late 
Republican reception and perception of the event: it is likely, in my view, that this tension is 
indicative of the fact that the issue over what happened to Rome in 390 B.C. was precisely that – 
an issue. In that view, the open manner in which Livy presents the constitutional disagreement to 
his readers in Book 5 (and of which he reminds them in Book 9) is to be understood as a 
reflection of the diverging views on the matter in his own day – i.e. of the lack of an agreed 
answer.45 The fact that Livy offers in this way ‘both’ versions to his readers regarding the 
constitutional fate of Rome in 390 B.C., in place of a single version in which Camillus for instance 
arrives with his army before a Roman surrender, to defeat the Gauls in battle, suggests then 
furthermore that the ‘rival’ version in which Rome formally, i.e. legitimately surrendered and 
subsequently ransomed itself was strong enough in Livy’s own day that its outright suppression 
would not carry persuasion.46 I show elsewhere that the constitutional argument as such was a 
late addition to the figure of Camillus, with a terminus post quem of 136 B.C.47 But the particular 
involvement of his readers on the part of Livy in addressing the constitutional challenge only 
makes sense if the issue had not long been settled, for instance late in the second century B.C., or 
in the first half of the first century B.C., but that it constituted an acute, and unresolved question 
in Livy’s own days. The fact that Polybius’ narrative only featured the version in which Rome 
pulled the short straw and the Gauls agreed to lift the siege and to liberate Rome on conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘civil and military history’ from now on than he had been able to in the first five books of the Ab urbe 
condita – because ‘of such records as existed in the commentaries of the pontiffs and in other public and 
private documents, most perished in the conflagration of the city’: 6.1.2-3. See also Livy 7.18.1, calculating 
a date in Rome’s history by reckoning from both the foundation of the city by Romulus and the Gallic 
Sack. 
44 J.H.C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon. Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy (Oxford, 2001), 142. Our 
principal sources for the Gallic attack on Rome are, besides Livy, Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch. On the chief differences between the strands preserved (and reworked) in 
these authors, see Gaertner (n. 3). See also the comments and contributions in n. 29 above. 
45 A similar disagreement can be traced regarding the question over the city’s capture or surrender. Livy’s 
narrative foregrounds the city’s successful defence (followed by surrender), also highlighted in Polyb. 
1.6.2-3 and 2.18.2-3, twice noting that the Capitoline Hill was not taken (but see also Polyb. 2.22.4-5). 
Tacitus, on the other hand, offers two different versions of the story: in Hist. 3.72.1, he prefers the 
version in which only the (lower) city is taken, whilst in Ann. 11.23.7, he has the Gauls also take the 
Capitoline Hill. The ancient disagreement is mirrored in the modern debate. The notion that the Gauls 
successfully took the Capitoline Hill has been argued in multiple studies by Otto Skutsch: ‘The fall of the 
Capitol’, JRS 43 (1953), 77-8; Studia Enniana (London, 1968), 138-42; ‘The fall of the Capitol again: 
Tacitus Ann. 11,23’, JRS 68 (1978), 93-4 (with reference to earlier, similar suggestions by other scholars); 
The Annals of Q. Ennius (Oxford, 1985), 408. For the opposing view, see esp. T.J. Cornell, ‘The Annals of 
Quintus Ennius’, JRS 76 (1986), 244-50. For a broader discussion of other key versions and variants as 
well as the wider context for historiographic disagreements in the period, see Williams (n. 44), 142-50.  
46 Roman history was more generally characterised in this period by a variety of different, rival 
approaches. The development of various media through which history was communicated in the late 
Republic, including opposing methods and perspectives, is discussed in Pausch (n. 25), 24-37. 
47 See Roth (n. 42). 
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that were satisfactory to them means on the other hand that we can assume that the story of a 
Roman surrender and ransom payment gained a wide circulation in the mid to late second, and 
on into the first century B.C.48 But this means that Livy’s reader was, consequently, not merely 
asked to wise up on their constitutional expertise, or to brush up on their historical knowledge, 
but, in effect, to take sides in a contemporary debate: Livy’s reader was asked to judge, as Kraus 
has put it (quoted above) – i.e. to commit to a view as to whether Camillus was right in an 
ongoing, contemporary debate on Rome’s fate in 390 B.C. 
 As stated, reaching a consensus is seen as the essential condition for the development of 
an authoritative version of the past. But the passage under discussion here, and the challenge that 
it poses to Livy’s contemporary readers, goes beyond the past, and also beyond the question of 
memory and remembering per se, which have been central to Feldherr’s argument about the 
authority behind Livy’s presentation of the past, quoted earlier: an exclusive focus on the past, 
and on the Romans’ historical memory, fails to explain the manner in which Livy challenges his 
readers over Camillus’ constitutional argument. It is notable in this context that Livy’s narrative 
of the above discussed happenings in the Hannibalic War pertaining to Fabius and Minucius also 
involves both internal and external narratees: Levene has shown that Minucius’ speech ‘strikes a 
chord in his listeners (22.14.15)’, concluding moreover that ‘the overlap with the Romans’ sense 
of their own traditional values suggests that he would strike one in Livy’s readers as well’.49 At 
the forefront of the Fabius-Minucius dispute is the question over the best military strategy – 
whether passive or aggressive: ‘the question is to determine the circumstances when it is 
appropriate to adopt each’; at root, the dispute is over what Levene has called ‘traditional and 
untraditional ways of Roman fighting’.50 Livy’s narrative thereby actively involves the reader in a 
matter to do with the proper Roman way of doing things. Both occasions, the Gallic Sack and 
the Hannibalic War, constitute watershed moments in Rome’s history: they are of critical 
importance for the late Republican Romans’ self-understanding, providing in turn occasion for 
dispute and disagreement. Leaving the Hannibalic War behind, the manner in which Livy 
presents the constitutional argument put forward by Camillus in 390 B.C. can, as proposed, best 
be explained if we see in it evidence for a contemporaneous, late Republican discourse that 
attracted different opinions. This also implies however that any consensus on what happened in 
390 B.C. could not have been based solely, or even primarily, on what Kraus has referred to as 
‘the reader’s recognition of familiar story patterns’.51 Clearly, some story elements were more 
established than others, some more familiar to Livy’s readers than others, but there were also 
some that lacked a sustained narrative pedigree altogether: Camillus’ constitutional argument falls 
into the latter group.52 The consensus on this matter was, then, still to emerge. In historical 
                                                          
48 Polyb. 1.6.2-3 and 2.18.2-3 (with n. 45 above). Polybius himself claimed that his history is of universal 
interest (1.1.5); he moreover postulated that his work is a possession for all time, specifying explicitly 
future readers (3.4.7-8). Modern scholars see Polybius’ audience primarily in Greek readers; but Polybius 
certainly expected Romans to read his history (too) and, perhaps, to be his most eager audience, given the 
subject matter of his work: e.g. 6.11.3 and 31.22.8-11. Polybius’ late(r) Roman Republican readership is 
sufficiently documented by Livy’s own use of Polybius – intensely discussed for instance for the fourth 
and fifth (and third) decades in H. Tränkle, Livius und Polybios (Basel and Stuttgart, 1977), and more 
recently specifically for the Hannibalic War narrative (and more) in D.S. Levene, Livy on the Hannibalic War 
(Oxford, 2010), passim. For a study of Polybius’ narratees (concentrated therefore on the historian’s Greek 
audience), see T. Rood, ‘Polybius’, in I.J.F de Jong, R. Nünlist, A. Bowie (edd.), Narrators, Narratees, and 
Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature (Leiden, 2004), 147-64, at 157-60. 
49 Levene (n. 48), 229. 
50 Levene (n. 48), 80-1 and 229. 
51 Kraus (n. 35), 264. 
52 The perspective championed here has broader implications for our appreciation of the role of inherited 
beliefs in Roman historiography: a recent, short overview of the issues involved is in C. Smith, 
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terms, we end up with a refined chronological range for the debate on Rome’s constitutional fate 
in 390 B.C. that generated the Camillan challenge of the mid to late first century B.C., including 
evidently the period of Livy’s intense composition of the first few pentads of the Ab urbe condita. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To sum up. The matter under discussion here serves to illustrate how Livy has exploited a 
seeming technicality in order to actively involve his readers in his historiographic project: 
through the use of the extradiegetic narrator who does not provide concluding comment, the 
juridical stalemate between the Gauls and Camillus regarding the constitutional validity of the 
Roman surrender and ransom agreement must be addressed by the readers, and irrespective of 
Camillus’ martial prowess that decides over the power relationship between Romans and Gauls 
thereafter. While Camillus orders his own men to liberate the city on the battlefield ‘with iron 
instead of gold’ (Suos … ferroque non auro reciperare patriam iubet, 5.49.3; cf. Ennius fr. 183-190 
Skutsch), Livy challenges his readers to liberate Rome in the calm of their studies through 
involving them in the kind of juridical decision-making that the Senate dealt with for real for 
instance in 210 B.C. – a bit like a dry-run. Put differently, Livy’s reader was asked to decide 
whether Rome was liberated in practice by brute force, on the battlefield, or whether Rome was 
to be seen instead as never having lost its juridical being at the hands of the Gauls in the first 
place. But by engaging his readers in a decision that falls into the realm of politics in its actual 
application – i.e. the question over a magistrate’s power and authority, as the example of Marcus 
Valerius Messalla illustrates – and that involved people in a real-life context in their political 
persona, i.e. as the People, Livy has transformed a seemingly passive activity (that he himself 
fraudulently claimed to help avert the gaze from contemporary politics: 1 praef. 5) into a prime 
tool for political socialisation. Thus, by reading Livy’s narrative of Camillus’ interference in the 
ransom exchange, and by subsequently taking sides in the debate on Camillus’ constitutional 
argument, Livy’s readers do not only take part in the making of Rome’s history, but they also 
turn into participants in the actual civic discourse of the day. In brief, Livy offers ‘citizenship 
training’ through the study of history. 
It is moreover unlikely that this activity was confined to the scholar’s closet. It is easy to 
imagine that Livy’s peers engaged in debate on the question of the constitutional validity of 
Camillus’ action upon the publication of the relevant parts of Livy’s Ab urbe condita. It is equally 
easy to imagine the debate to have continued also outside the small group of Rome’s 
predominantly male adult elite that I have tacitly privileged in the above considerations, and the 
‘correct’ answer to have been transmitted beyond a narrow literary circle. In his quest for the 
significance of the people in the political practice of Republican Rome, Wiseman has suggested 
that Camillus’ sudden interference in the ransom exchange points to the performance of this 
episode on the stage, thus substantially enlarging the potential audience of (at least this episode 
told in) the Ab urbe condita.53 Public recitations offered another space for the wider dissemination 
of the latest literary endeavours, including the opportunity for exchange and debate, and are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Introduction’, in K. Sandberg and id. (edd.), Omnium annalium monumenta: Historical Writing and Historical 
Evidence in Republican Rome (Leiden, 2018), 1-13, at 7-12. 
53 T.P. Wiseman, Unwritten Rome (Exeter, 2008), 35. Note, however, that Wiseman’s insistence that 
Camillus’ crossing of the enemy lines (to enter Rome) lacks a backdrop in the practice of siege warfare 
does not hold: U. Roth, ‘The Gallic ransom and the Sack of Rome: Livy 5.48.7-8’, Mnemosyne 71 (2018), 
460-84, at 480-3. Note also that the Gallic siege narrative in Livy features two other scenes that involve 
the crossing of enemy lines: 5.46.1-3 (i.e. the performance of a family sacrifice on the Quirinal Hill by 
Gaius Fabius Dorsuo), and 5.46.8-11 (i.e. the daring acts of Pontius Cominus who functioned as courier 
between Rome, Veii and Ardea), with nn. 14 and 21 above. For discussion of the performance character 
of Livy’s narrative and the associated enlargement of his audience, see generally Pausch (n. 25), 38-45.  
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documented for Rome in the period of the gestation and publication of the Ab urbe condita, 
including by individuals who also wrote history: the public recital of the products of Greek 
historians are moreover clearly attested, which enticed Dalzell to comment more broadly that 
‘history was a genre which lent itself to public recital’.54  
Similarly important for civic discourse must have been monumental displays, with or 
without inscriptional information: as Sandberg and colleagues have recently stressed, ‘sources of 
historical knowledge (or, better, notions about the past) exist in altogether other forms than in 
the guise of records and written accounts, and even outside the medium of writing itself’.55 Most 
notable, perhaps, in the period of immediate interest here, is the display of the elogia of Rome’s 
great heroes in both the Forum Romanum and the Forum Augustum, which included Camillus.56 
These monuments offered prime space for the broader dissemination of Camillus’ great deeds, 
for the lively exchange between viewers of different social pedigrees, and for the instruction of 
male children by their fathers in the course of one or other customary ambulatio – in the latter 
scenario also enhancing the continued, future transmission of Camillus’ deeds.57 That these men 
and their elogia did indeed attract comment is demonstrated not least through their inclusion in 
the poetry of one of Livy’s contemporaries – Ovid: Ovid imagines Mars visiting ‘his’ new forum, 
describing in the process the location of the inscriptions below each statue (Fast. 5.566: claraque 
dispositis acta subesse uiris; and see generally 5.545-98, with Mars’ visit at 5.545-69).  
Moreover, not only its architecture, but also the visual programme of the Forum 
Augustum was copied elsewhere: numerous towns within and outside of Italy, including Pompeii 
and Arezzo, Mérida in the west of the Empire, and Aphrodisias in Asia Minor, benefitted from 
the creation of images or structures that resembled the Roman forum of Augustus, or that were at 
least in active dialogue with it, in some cases even displaying copies of the elogia, including word-
for-word copies.58 Zanker therefore stressed the empire-wide impact of the display.59 In short, as 
                                                          
54 A. Dalzell, ‘Pollio and the early history of public recitation at Rome’, Hermathena 86 (1955), 20-8; with 
Sen. Controv. 4, praef. 2. Note also that Suetonius remarks that public recitals could attract large audiences, 
commenting on the recitals of Ennius’ Annals by Quintus Vargunteius: Gram. et rhet. 2. For discussion of 
earlier public recitals of Greek histories, see Dalzell (this n.), 23. 
55 K. Sandberg, ‘Monumenta, documenta, memoria: remembering and imagining the past in late Republican 
Rome’, in id. and C. Smith (edd.), Omnium annalium monumenta: Historical Writing and Historical Evidence in 
Republican Rome (Leiden, 2018), 351-89, at 352; see also the contributions by S. Bernard, G. Cifani, P.J.E. 
Davies and K.-J. Hölkeskamp in the volume. 
56 Camillus was included in the line-up of summi viri in both the Forum Romanum and in Augustus’ new 
forum – the Forum Augustum. The chronological (and other) relationship between the elogia in the 
Forum Augustum and those in the Forum Romanum is debated, but not critical for the present 
argument. For brief discussion of the chronological aspects (with earlier bibliography), see S. Panciera 
(ed.), Iscrizioni greche e latine del Foro Romano e del Palatino. Inventario generale – inediti – revisioni (Rome, 1996), 
100 and 131-9; for an overview of the visual programme of the Forum Augustum, see P. Zanker, Forum 
Augustum. Das Bildprogramm (Tübingen, 1968). Camillus’ elogium has survived in part, listing inter alia the 
conquest of Veii, the expulsion of the Etruscans from Sutrium, and the wars against the Aequi and the 
Volsci: CIL I2 (Pars 1), VII = CIL VI.1308; with A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Italiae XIII. 3. Elogia (Rome, 
1937), no. 61 (pp. 38-9); see also Panciera (ed.), (this n.), 102, no. 2. 
57 The transmission of historical understanding from father to son is encapsulated forcefully in Livy’s own 
text in the speech put into the mouth of Lucius Lentulus, the princeps legatorum, in the narrative concerned 
with the Roman debacle at the Caudine Forks in 321 B.C. (see above, p. 8), in which Lentulus contends 
that he has ‘often heard (his) father say that on the Capitol he was the only man who did not urge the 
senate to ransom the community from the Gauls with gold’, thus also stressing the regularity of the 
paternal exposition of the past, here precisely of the Gallic Sack: 9.4.8. 
58 A short summary is in V. Kockel, ‘Forum Augustum’, in E.M. Steinby (ed.), Lexicon topographicum urbis 
romae, Vol. 2 (Rome, 1995), 289-95, at 293. Note however also the careful interpretation of the visual 
programme of the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias within a Greek myth-history paradigm by R.R.R. Smith, 
‘The imperial reliefs from the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias’, JRS 77 (1987), 88-138, esp. 93-6 and 135-6. 
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the example of the elogia of Rome’s great heroes, displayed in Rome and elsewhere shows, we 
must assume that Livy’s Camillan story fell on fertile ground for discussion, debate and argument 
in a multitude of fora, material and intellectual.60 But by whatever means Livy’s narrative of 
Camillus’ constitutional argument entered those fora, the participants in the debate about it not 
only took part in the making of Rome’s history by playing their role in the establishment of a 
consensus on a past matter, but they also contributed in the process to the actual civic discourse 
of the day. If this view is accepted, this means that the constitutional issue emerges as a living 
component of the then current civic debate.61  
What has been suggested above, and in this article throughout, means of course also that 
Camillus’ constitutional argument must in effect have functioned to polarise Livy’s 
contemporary audience, with some preferring to stick to the version displayed for instance in 
Polybius’ history, which saw the Romans defeated without any last-minute rescue, and others 
accepting the newer variant that denied the surrender and ransom exchange on juridical 
grounds.62 In consequence, the seemingly harmless ancient fairy-tale of Camillus’ heroic rescue 
of Rome would have given rise to active exchange and disagreement on what was in fact a 
critical political matter. In his comparative study of the Augustan elogia and Livy’s text, Luce has 
long noted that there were noticeable discrepancies between the Livian Camillus and the 
Augustan one; and, he concludes:63 
 
The elogia […] pursue an independent course in the information they provide about the summi 
viri, disagreeing not only with Livy, but on some points with all other sources that survive. The 
disagreements with Livy, however, are curiously many, especially when we consider that the elogia 
for the most part select for mention the highlights of the careers of famous men: doubly curious 
given that most elogia are very fragmentary and given how brief the few are that survive complete, 
or nearly complete; triply so, given the fame that Livy’s history enjoyed. The suspicion arises that 
on particular points the elogia may have deliberately been making correctives or ripostes to Livy’s 
version of events […] 
 
Whatever Augustus may have intended with the creation of his forum, dispute among viewers of 
the elogia who knew their Livy was, plainly, predictable. But a similar potential for disagreement 
was, I have argued, already contained in Livy’s own oeuvre, by design, regarding Camillus’ 
argument about his powers as dictator. By so doing, Livy channelled – seemingly oddly – 
attention towards the constitutional dimension of the episode, despite the subsequent solution to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Augustus’ own elogium – i.e. the Res Gestae – was of course to be reproduced for display throughout the 
Empire. 
59 Zanker (n. 56), 27: ‘Die propagandistische Wirkung des Forum – das kann man schon aufgrund der 
zufälligen Funde sagen – estreckte sich auf das ganze Imperium’. 
60 A multiplicity of fora (real and intellectual) for the communication of history is characteristic of Rome 
more generally, including also the funerary procession, the domestic display of ancestor masks (with 
elogia), historical epic, drama, etc.: a brief summary is in Pausch (n. 25), 18-24, concluding (at 24) that a 
high proportion of Rome’s population possessed considerable familiarity with a range of diverse 
historiographic media (‘erhebliche “Medienkompetenz”’). 
61 On the broader issue of the reflective capacity of the Ab urbe condita regarding contemporary 
developments, see Pausch (n. 25), 32-7; for a specific interpretation of the Ab urbe condita in its (Augustan) 
context, see Mineo (n. 3 [2006]), 71-82 and 109-34 (and passim). 
62 The fragmentary record of Rome’s historiography makes it difficult to gauge how Rome’s (Republican) 
historians handled this matter: see now T.J. Cornell (ed.), The Fragments of the Roman Historians, 3 vols. 
(Oxford, 2013). 
63 T.J. Luce, ‘Livy, Augustus, and the Forum Augustum’, in K.A. Raaflaub and M. Toher (edd.), Between 
Republic and Empire. Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford, 1990), 
123-38, at 136-7. 
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the power struggle between the Gauls and Rome on the battlefield: why the constitutional fate of 
Rome in 390 B.C. mattered so much in the age of revolution that it gained centre-stage in Livy’s 
text is, then, the real conundrum of the story, especially at a time when Rome had successfully 
subjected its most feared enemies, from the Gauls to the Carthaginians.64 For now, suffice it to 
acknowledge that Livy’s narrative of Camillus’ challenge to the Roman surrender and ransom 
agreement is a relic of a political culture of open public exchange and disagreement that was 
about to be lost forever at Rome – irrespective of whether Camillus was right or not. 
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64 Cicero famously contended in 63 B.C. that ‘no king is left, no people, no nation, whom you need fear: 
there is no evil from outside, of others’ causing’: Cic. Rab. Perd. 33. See also Cic. Cat. 2.11. Nevertheless, 
the Roman fear of the Gauls is well documented, and has received plentiful discussion: e.g. Williams (n. 
44), 170-82, and H. Bellen, Metus gallicus – metus punicus. Zum Furchtmotiv in der römischen Republik (Mainz, 
1985). 
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